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Massive privatization in the Argentine infrastructure and public service sectors gave an
opportunity to explore why we observe notorious differences in regulatory design choices
and performance outcomes across sectors, under the umbrella of similar nation-specific
institutional characteristics -same federal government producing reform during a short
period of time (1990-95)-. Following the Levy and Spiller (1996) conceptual framework,
we propose that some institutional characteristics (namely the nature of conflicts among
groups affected by reform and administrative capabilities) determined a wide variety of
government choices for regulatory incentives, producing different outcomes across sectors.
Despite the will of the executive power to respect stable “rules of the game”, episodes of
government opportunism appeared in most sectors.  Poor regulatory incentive design and
weak agencies, on the other hand, prompted ex-post opportunistic behavior from regulated
firms, which renegotiated contractual conditions to their favor.
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I. Introduction
In a cross-country study on the telecommunications industry, Levy and
Spiller (1996) found that the institutional endowments of each country
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constrained government’s choices on regulatory governance and incentives,
therefore being important determinants of regulatory effectiveness and
credibility, as well as sector performance.  We use this conceptual framework
to examine why performance and regulatory design could vary across sectors
within a same country.  In this context, although most elements of institutional
endowments are common to all sectors, (namely, legislative and executive
institutions, nature of the judicial system, informal norms) we observe
differences in the contests among groups with divergent interests. We also
observe differences in administrative capabilities within government agencies.
These two factors seem to help explain some of the variances found across
sectors.
In particular, we make the following propositions that we explore
throughout the regulatory experience in various infrastructure sectors:
a. Mosaic of contract design was bolstered by decentralized decisions
with different administrative capabilities: Argentine public sector reform
was managed in a highly decentralized fashion.  Crucial reform and regulatory
choices were taken within the orbit of secretariats and ad-hoc commissions
within the Executive Power, which individually enjoyed a considerable degree
of freedom on how to set up new regulatory institutions, and had little
coordination among them. Different backgrounds and beliefs of decision-
makers prompted a mosaic of contract design and eventually resulted in
distinctive administrative capabilities, divergently affecting performance
among sectors.
b. Influence of interest groups limited regulatory design choices: In
some sectors regulatory design choices were substantially limited by the
influence of interest groups. Decision-makers had to accept compromises to
make reform happen. Finding these middle courses, however, typically resulted
in poor regulatory incentives design, which in turn made contracts more
vulnerable to opportunistic behavior from both firms and government.219 INSTITUTIONS, CONTRACTS AND REGULATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE
c. Unresolved conflicts among interest groups, put pressure for
regulatory changes: In some regulatory episodes, groups that were less
influential at the time of reform, and therefore received little gains from
privatization (or were even made worse off), are likely to put growing pressure
for contractual changes in their favor. For example, these are the cases of
urban poor who were asked to fully pay water access costs, or highway users
facing tolls substantially above short run marginal costs.1
In this paper we explore regulatory design and contracts in the following
sectors: telecommunications; electricity transmission and distribution; gas
transportation and distribution, water and sanitation; interurban and urban
highways and roads; waterways, and freight and passenger railways
transportation (urban and interurban).
From the analysis of cases we also found some collateral institutional
outcomes related to the cross-sector comparison of regulatory design and
practice. These are the cases of important issues such as how did conflict
resolution mechanisms work in each sector, the degree of autonomy and
transparency of regulatory agencies, the role of Congress, and means of
participation from consumer groups.
II. Institutions and Contracts in Argentine Infrastructure
Regulation
A. Conceptual Framework
A satisfactory behavior of infrastructure regulation requires a delicate
balance between the political stability that made reform possible, and the
1 In other regulatory episodes, the dynamic of the market could also play an important role
in generating new conflicts among groups. Technological and commercial innovations
that facilitate competition in areas which were previously uncontested (such as long-distance
calls in telecommunications or retail access in gas and electricity) are good examples of
how enhanced competition imposes contractual stress.220 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
flexibility needed to adapt contracts to changing circumstances and technology.
To be successful in attracting private capital, the reform had to be credible
and sustainable to the eyes of investors. Credible in this context means that
the risk of administrative expropriation should be restrained. If investors
perceive that the expropriation risk is too high they will demand in return a
very high risk premium for their investment, or they would not invest at all.
Spiller (1998) suggests that most countries do not have a system with
constitutional protection against expropriation and that, to make things even
worse, there is a lack of effective mechanisms to resolve these conflicts.
For reform to be sustainable, in turn, regulatory institutions have to be
very strong to balance the demands of the different groups directly involved
and, at the same time, to be able to adapt to changing circumstances. Weakness
of existing regulatory institutions is a main concern in most Latin American
countries. This institutional weakness could cause imbalances that allow
government opportunism, facilitating decisions that favor short-run interests
(of different kinds) at the expense of the interest of society (most likely, to the
detriment of current and future infrastructure users). Opportunistic moves
that seemingly benefit current consumers (i.e. decisions to keep prices low)
may well have a very short-lived effect since private investment and product
quality are likely to be reduced, ultimately hitting back on consumers.
As Spiller (1998) points out, privatization success does not depend on
how the bid is organized but on how risks of administrative expropriation are
managed ex-post. The functioning of regulatory institutions is therefore the
key element to judge privatization success and whether reform will be
sustainable through time. In sectors where ex-post expropriation risk is lower
incentives for allocative, dynamic and cost efficiency will work properly. A
collateral effect is that fiscal consequences will also be favorable, through
higher net taxes and fees paid to government.
Following Levy and Spiller (1996) we can look at regulation as a design
problem with two principal components: regulatory governance2 and
2 Williamson (1985) called this element “contractual governance institutions.”222 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
In general, we could argue that the basic institutional characteristics
severely limited regulatory governance choices of Argentine decision-makers.
Several authors coincide that the Menem administration was much more
focused on how to make public enterprises look attractive for privatization
than on how these firms were to be regulated and the new specific institutions
that ought to be created for that purpose.3 And within regulatory choices, the
attention was centered on questions related to regulatory incentives rather
than on the set up of the institutions that were needed to make reform
sustainable. Hill and Abdala (1993), for instance, point out that in the
telecommunications sector there was a conscious government decision to give
priority to a speedy sale process over the creation of the regulatory body
CNT (Comisión Nacional de Telecomunicaciones) and the writing of detailed
and more specific norms that were needed to regulate the sector.4  Something
similar happened in electricity, where ENRE (Ente Nacional Regulador de la
Electricidad) started to operate several months after the privatization of the
first generation and distributions firms that emerged from the public enterprise
SEGBA. A more recent example is found in airports, where the winning
consortium had to delay the take over of its new activities until ORSNA
(Organismo Regulador del Sistema Nacional de Aeropuertos) started its
operations. In railway transportation, on the other hand, there were several
agencies with jurisdiction over different railway services, which eventually
were merged into CNRT (Comisión Nacional de Regulación del Transporte).
Lastly, in the waterways concession for the lower Paraná river, the regulatory
agency that was supposed to be in charge of regulating the sector (according
to what was set through a Presidential decree) was never organized.
3 See among others, Spiller and Levy (1993), Hill and Abdala (1993), Shaikh et. al. (1995),
Rausch (1995), Baylac (1996), and Heller and McCubbins (1997).
4 The CNT later turned into CNC (Comisión Nacional de Comunicaciones).223 INSTITUTIONS, CONTRACTS AND REGULATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE
B. Basic Institutional Characteristics
Interaction between the Executive and Legislative Power
The main restraints to the exercise of discretionary power comes from the
constitutional provision that establishes the principle of division of powers,
the representation of legislative chambers, and the decentralization that
emerges from a federal organization.
Spiller (1998) comments that Latin American countries have strong
presidential systems where laws passed by the legislative power normally
have to be “regulated” by a presidential decree. In the United States, on the
contrary, administrative agencies directly implement the law, while Congress
watchdogs that its spirit and interpretation is not altered. As a consequence in
the United States utility regulation laws are very detailed whereas in Latin
America (with some exception in Chile) laws are more generic and its detailed
regulation is entrusted to the Executive. Discretionary moves by the Executive
are then more likely, since it has powers to alter the regulatory incentives
faced by firms, and therefore determines the success or failure of privatization
programs. In a few sectors the Argentine Congress have passed specific
legislation to set regulatory frameworks for privatized utilities (gas, electricity,
oil, ports, and nuclear assets).  But even in these cases some powers were
granted to the Executive to retain control in key aspects such as tariffs,
competition policy and barriers of entry. This high degree of discretion in the
hands the Executive makes short-run interests to prime and this also had an
adverse consequence on the autonomy of regulatory agencies, as it will be
seen below, in section C.
The relationship between the executive and legislative was nurtured by
the special political conditions prevalent in 1989, when Menem took office.
As part of a broader political agreement with the opposition, Congress passed
two laws that were key to the privatization program: a State Reform Act and
an Economic Emergency Act. The first one gave the Executive phenomenal
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suspended subsidies and lifted barriers to foreign investment. This delegation
of broad powers to the Executive is an exception to the beggar-thy-neighbor
policy that normally prevails in Argentine politics, where the only beneficiaries
are the short-term interests of the party in power, to the expense of the economy
and giving rise to a polarized society.5
The influence of the Argentine Congress in regulation was therefore
limited, and centered on generic bounds given to the Executive, rather than
on the specifics of how to privatize and how to regulate. Currently, Congress
participates through a special commission that follows up privatized utilities
and, through one of its agencies, the national auditing body (Auditoría General
de la Nación) which controls the performance of regulatory bodies. This is
not a static status quo, however, since Congress has progressively been trying
to obtain a larger role in the matter.
Judicial Institutions
When laws and administrative procedures are not enough to restrain
discretionary moves from government, a competent and honest judiciary
provides an alternative road to avoid administrative expropriation.
In Argentina, judges are in general not seen as either truthful or skilled to
perform this task. A recent Pan-American poll conducted by RAC & Mori
International made in February 1998 revealed that only 15% of Argentines
have a positive view on their judicial institutions. In the United States, the
same question had a 59% acceptance, whereas the average for Latin America
was 25%.  Other polls show similar results.6
The new Constitution enacted in 1994 modifies the way judges are
appointed and eventually removed. It creates a special forum (Consejo de la
Magistratura) that promotes competition and requires qualifications for the
5 See Levy and Spiller (1993).
6 See for example the Gallup, and Fundación CEDEAL results cited in Abdala (1998).225 INSTITUTIONS, CONTRACTS AND REGULATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE
appointment of judges. It also provides a procedure for removal that is more
independent from political parties.  But these changes were implemented very
recently, during 1998.
Spiller (1998) interprets that the judicial power in Latin America, unlike
its American counterpart, does not have enough experience in supervising
the way that the Executive “regulates” the laws. It rather concentrates on
determining whether a regulation is against the Constitution or not.
Since the judicial system offers little guarantees as a mechanism to solve
conflicts between firms and regulators, foreign investors sought additional
protection from international agreements.  If countries are members of trading
blocks the possibilities of introducing subsidies to electricity or gas tariffs,
for instance, are limited, and these are sources of additional preservation
against opportunism. The more open the economy the more vulnerable the
country to suffer retaliation if it violates settled trading practices. There are
also bilateral agreements that refer to the way countries should treat foreign
investment. Finally, conditions imposed by multilateral credit organizations
which helped finance reforms also constitute an additional safeguard for
investors.
Administrative Capabilities
This element refers to the skills and ability of government human resources
to handle complex regulatory concepts and processes in an effective way,
minimizing conflicts and unwanted legal contests.
It is not simple to evaluate this characteristic within the Argentine context
since there are scarce elements to evaluate it objectively. Our main proposition
is that the different backgrounds and beliefs of decision-makers that were in
charge of implementing reforms prompted a mosaic of contract design and
resulted in distinctive administrative capabilities of regulators across sectors.
Let us turn to the group of decision-makers first.
The Argentine public sector reform was managed in a highly decentralized
fashion. In a study undertaken by the General Accounting Office (1996) about226 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
how different countries had privatized public utilities it was noted that one of
the main peculiarities of Argentina was that the process of decision making
was less centralized and much more flexible than other countries such as
Mexico, France, UK, New Zealand, and Canada. This decentralized feature
was explicitly embodied in the State Reform Act, which allowed reform and
regulatory choices to be taken within the orbit of secretariats and ad-hoc
commissions within the Executive Power. These secretariats and commissions
had little coordination among them, sometimes even null. If any economies
of scope existed in the design of reform across sectors, these were apparently
lost. Decision-makers did not have to follow any rigid procedures on how to
privatize, and even less on how to set up regulatory institutions. The GAO
report also points out that the flexibility and speed with which Argentina
privatized its main public services could help explain why regulatory
administrative capabilities were not best developed, since government may
have not been able to set up adequate regulatory environments while it was
undertaking the privatization effort.
Decentralization meant that reform decision-makers had different
background, beliefs and also administrative capabilities.7 This, in turn, helps
explain the variety of contract design and therefore performance found among
sectors. Table 1 summarizes some of these differences.
As for the administrative capabilities of regulators, we looked backward
to the issue and found that Gerchunoff and Visintini (1990) stated that political
and macroeconomic instability had inhibited the creation of a bureaucracy
with enough capacity to regulate private utilities. The authors argued that
since the rate of return demanded by investors included such a high-risk
premium, regulators were keen to protect firms in those sectors where sunk
investment had been made.  Therefore, in their opinion, Argentina was missing
a class of skilled regulators capable of confronting strong demands from
regulated private firms.
7 According to Rausch (1995) “Each privatization was designed according to the
peculiarities, interests and available technical capabilities of each sector.”230 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
If we agree that capable human resources were not available at the end of
the 1980s, then what did change, if anything, with respect to the stock of
human capital that the government had in the early 1990s?  The newly created
regulatory agencies had some extra support at least in their initial phases. In
most agencies external consultants were hired to help organize their activities
and to erect their administrative capabilities. However, the culture of a “modern
regulator” is likely to be still missing.  As the World Bank (1993) pointed out,
autonomous regulatory agencies administering key legislation on public
services are unfamiliar institutions to the recent Argentine history, so one
must expect that it will take several years to develop proper administrative
capabilities.
The most evident differences in administrative capabilities related to
decentralization can be found since the inception of each regulatory agency.
Whereas in electricity, gas, telecommunications and water a new agency was
set up, in other sectors such as interurban road transportation the transition to
a more specialized regulatory body was slower, and the administrative
capabilities of regulators suffered with such organizational delays. It took the
Secretariat of Public Works (SPW) two years to delegate regulatory power to
Dirección Nacional de Vialidad (DNV) which had an internal group paralleling
SPW’s de-facto regulatory functions. Eventually, DNV created an internal
branch called OCCV (Organismo de Control de Concesiones Viales) to
regulate road concessions.  A similar situation applied to railway regulators,
a sector which needed more than three years (from September 1993 to
November 1996) to sort out a more stable institutional setup.  In waterways,
the start-up situation was even worse, as the regulatory agency that ought to
be created was never put in place (the Undersecretary of Waterways taking
its role).8
Needless to say, decentralization also meant that the scope, degree of
8 For more evidence on the organizational differences among agencies and its various
degrees of real power and autonomy, see Abdala (1998), Artana et. al (1999), FIEL (1999),
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autonomy and internal organization of regulatory agencies differed across
sectors. Not all agencies have been organized with sufficient technical and
professional staff needed to handle complex regulatory issues. In ETOSS
(Ente Tripartito de Obras y Servicios Sanitarios), the staff is not highly qualified
compared to other regulatory bodies.  The staff skills may not be the best for
a regulator whose most important responsibility is tariff setting; ETOSS had
only four economists and four accountants versus 20 engineers in 1995. On
the contrary, the professional composition of ENARGAS (Ente Nacional
Regulador del Gas) by 1994 shows 30% of engineers, 19% from economic
sciences and 13% lawyers.  ENARGAS, as well as ENRE, has also developed
specific methodologies and internal procedures for resolving cases, that are
far more advanced than those observed in other agencies.
The composition of the board of directors is another indicator that speaks
about the sources of differences in administrative capabilities. In ETOSS,
given its multi-jurisdictional scope, directors have been appointed politically,
without open competition. The same occurred in CNC, albeit for different
reasons (successive interventions). Political appointees are less keen to develop
a well-endowed professional task force of regulators.
Public opinions about the perception of the performance of regulators
seem to reflect this disparity on technical qualifications. ETOSS (water and
sanitation), CNRT (transport), CNC (telecommunications) and ORSNA
(airports) are among the most controversial and are perceived as low
performers. On the other hand, ENRE (electricity) and ENARGAS (gas
distribution and transportation) enjoyed a good reputation.9
Pattern of Social Conflicts
We distinguish two basic components for patterns of social conflicts: the
9 ENRE’s reputation was severely damaged during the prolonged blackout suffered by
Edesur users in February 1999. A recent poll showed that 66% of interviewed people
thought that electricity distribution was poorly regulated.232 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
contests among influence groups with divergent interests and conflicts
attributed to ideological causes. We discard the latter in the Argentine context
and concentrate in the nature of conflicts among interest groups.
During the reform process, interest groups had influence over decision-
makers both at the legislative and executive levels. In some sectors decision-
makers had to accept compromises to make reform happen, as regulatory
design choices were limited by the influence of interest groups. This settlement
typically resulted in poor regulatory incentives design, which in turn made
contracts more vulnerable to opportunistic behavior from both firms and
government.
After reform, many of the contending interests did not disappear. In some
sectors these conflicts (and their divergent views about the effects of regulation)
were more severe than others. For instance, the impact of high toll fees on
current road users was higher and more visible than the unaffordable access
charges originally established for new water and sewerage users.
In utilities and public services where users coincide with a massive urban
population (such as residential users of water, telecommunications, gas,
electricity, urban railways transport and urban highways), government is more
keen to be receptive to their demands since these consumers typically form a
big part of its voters. In these sectors users (or subgroups of users) are more
visible and politically influential and hence there is a growing pressure to keep
prices low and to alter conditions in favor of users. Government has been
tempted to behave opportunistically, altering contracts to benefit its supporters.
However, it is also true that in certain circumstances government interests may
coincide with those of the regulated enterprise (for instance, when government
retains a stake in the firm, when subsidies are at stake, or when government
makes specific requests for new or accelerated investment).  Under these
particular conditions the influence of users as a group of interest could become
more diffuse, depending also on the proximity of election dates.10
10 For example, during 1991/92, the government was interested in selling its shares from
Telecom and Telefónica.  In a move that increased enterprise value, government extended233 INSTITUTIONS, CONTRACTS AND REGULATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE
The government would in principle be less receptive to less massive (and
therefore less visible and less influential) users such as those consuming
interurban railways passenger and freight transportation, airport services,
waterways, electricity small-businesses, long distance telecommunications,
interurban toll roads, and population who is yet to receive water and sanitation
services. Some of these groups of users may try to exercise influence through
organized associations like industry chambers and associations (i.e. freight
transportation). In other cases they may seek political representation and
influence through the opposition party (like the urban poor who were yet to
be connected to water and sanitation services) or through provincial
governments (long distance telecommunication users, waterways, interurban
railways transportation, interurban roads). We must notice that this is an
unstable situation since groups that were less influential at the time of reform,
and therefore received little gains from privatization (or were even made
worse off), are likely to put growing pressure for contractual changes in their
favor.
This instability has clearly been the case of the water and sanitation sector,
where the population who was yet to be connected to the municipal service
faced exorbitant access charges. Such situation was hard to sustain both on
historic and present equity grounds. When the water service was in the hands
of the former public enterprise OSN (Obras Sanitarias de la Nación), access
charges were negligible, and the wealthiest population was the recipient of these
subsidies, which were financed basically through taxpayers money. The
population   that  OSN  was  unable  to  serve  (at  the  time  of  privatization,
1993, unsatisfied demand accounted to 30% in water and 48% in sewerage)
claimed that they should also be connected without having to pay high access
charges. Considering water connection externalities and taking into account
exclusivity licenses to five provinces originally served by other operators (CAT and CET),
who had been recently taken over by Telecom and Telefónica. It also granted free entry to
the second band of cellular services nationwide. Both actions precluded the possibility of
increased competition for the market, which could have benefited consumers.234 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
that the main beneficiaries are the poor, there are strong reasons why
government should allow some forms of direct and/or cross subsidies in water
and sanitation access.
Unfavorable macroeconomic conditions (deficit of current account,
recession, high unemployment, etc.) together with lack of progress on structural
development conditions (such as income distribution, education, health and
others) will also put pressure for changes in the way utilities are regulated.
Both the executive and legislative power may be tempted to enforce
redistributive measures through the way tariffs are determined or through
other means. New competitive forces (a technological or commercial
innovation) will likely put stress on outdated contractual arrangements. This
has been the case of sectors like telecommunications, gas and electricity.
We must point out that despite the unresolved conflicts of interest among
contending groups presented here, in all sectors there are substantial
improvements in the performance of private utilities, especially when
compared with their past public counterparts. The sectors where investment
flourished the most (hence performance is better in relative terms) were
telecommunications, electricity and gas. In water and sanitation, railways,
toll roads, and waterways, private investment was of a lower absolute
magnitude though nevertheless there were improvements at quantity and
quality levels. In all transportation sectors government subsidies were high
before reform. Subsidies were reduced with reform (although they did not
disappear), and recently there has been a tendency to gradually eliminate
them within the current renegotiation wave.
C. Regulatory Governance
What actions did the Argentine government take to restrain itself from
exercising ex-post opportunism in privatized infrastructure sectors? The
answer is not uniform across sectors, although there are several common
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a. Government promoted credibility and commitment to reform
completion and to make it sustainable through time. It made clear that it would
respect the basic rules of the game under which private investment took place.
The elements used for credibility varied from informal contacts with business
leaders to political pressure on regulatory agencies and other institutions in
charge of solving conflicts. We could say that, in general, whenever there
was a major potential conflict because of new circumstances or due to gray
areas in the interpretation of contracts, the executive power (not necessarily
the regulatory agencies) would give the benefit of the doubt to investors
(sometimes at the expense of other goals such as promotion of competition,
or consumer protection). This was a strong signal that the government was
willing to show commitment to reform. But through time the need to show
commitment and promote credibility was fading. And given the change in
public opinion about the way privatized firms were regulated, the credibility
element was certainly losing grounds, and the new administration that took
office in 1999 is not committed in the same way as Menem’s.
b. Government created specific legislation to protect investors, creating
new regulatory frameworks for each of the infrastructure sectors. Where
feasible, it promoted primary legislation (laws), such as in electricity, gas,
oil, ports, and nuclear activities. Otherwise, presidential decrees were used.
The executive power had a considerable amount of discretion to “regulate”
primary legislation. It did so through enforcement of presidential decrees
regulating or complementing the laws, and through the use of ministerial and
secretariat resolutions. All of this secondary legislation is relatively easy to
overturn.
c. Government created new regulatory agencies known as “entes
reguladores” and transformed some of the existing ones (such as Dirección
Nacional de Vialidad). In some cases efforts were made to turn these agencies
into autonomous and capable institutions. But despite all what has been said
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from the Executive power11. Despite all sort of formal efforts to grant some
autonomy (budget independence, appointment and duration of directors, etc.)
the truth is that whenever the Executive felt that regulators were taking
decisions that could harm its short-term interest, no formal barriers to the
removal of appointees seemed to be effective. To illustrate this point, it is
noteworthy to find that in those agencies where formal barriers to discretionary
exit were stricter (such as CNC where a previous indictment is required, or
ETOSS where removal requires to overcome a heavy bureaucratic procedure
within the public administration) removal has been more common and frequent
than in other agencies (like ENARGAS and ENRE) where office removal only
requires a justified decision by the Executive. For example, during its first eight
years of existence, six different presidents have directed CNC, three of which
were “interventores”. A clear example of how easy it is to alter attributions of
newly regulatory agencies, including its board of directors, comes from the
transportation sector. In railways, the government created in 1993 the CNTF
(Comisión Nacional de Transporte Ferroviario) to handle regulatory issues
related to freight and interurban passengers. Urban and metropolitan railways
were handled directly by an existing agency within the Ministry of Economics.
A special agency was also created to solve contractual conflicts, the CNRF
(Comisión Nacional de Regulación Ferroviaria). This institutional set up did
not last more than eight months. In April 1994 the government realized that
there were overlapping functions between CNTF and CNRF, and limited the
attributions of these agencies, transferring decision power to the Secretariat of
Transport. In November 1996, there was a new institutional reshuffle, and all
railway regulatory agencies were merged with an existing agency that regulated
automobile transportation. In this process, existing directors were removed and
new commissioners appointed. Government clearly failed to make these
agencies less vulnerable to the short-run interests of the executive power. This
is an important institutional weakness of the Argentine design to regulate
11 For a recent work see, for instance, Urbiztondo et. al (1997).237 INSTITUTIONS, CONTRACTS AND REGULATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE
privatized utilities. In addition, in many cases there are overlapping functions
between the regulatory agency and the Ministry or the Secretariat which is the
primary body in charge of solving the most relevant aspects of the contractual
relationship between firms and government (such as tariffs, investments,
duration of the concession, etc.).  Other relevant decisions like barriers of entry
or competition policy are within the domain of Secretariats and are not
supervised by the antitrust agency (Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la
Competencia). There are some gray areas of jurisdiction both at this level as
well as with sectors that have provincial incumbencies.
d. Government celebrated written contracts with privatized firms.
These contractual agreements normally took the form of concessions
(electricity distribution and transmission, roads, railways, water), although there
were other arrangements such as exclusivity licenses (telecommunications),
and permits (gas, and at an early stage, telephone cooperatives). In more
competitive sectors such as electricity generators, the general contractual
conditions were established in the core bidding documents signed at the time
of privatization. Contracts have a considerable amount of detailed regulation
(investment requirements, tariff regime, quality and quantity targets, penalties,
incentives and so on). They also include exit conditions and the specific
mechanisms for conflict resolution.  Since contracts can not foresee all future
circumstances and technological changes, there was also a need to establish
procedures on how to review and modify contractual terms under these
contingencies. Uniformity across sectors is also absent here. In some sectors
procedures are more specific and transparent (requiring mandatory public
hearings, etc.) whereas in others there is poor design, which led to poor
regulatory practice at the time of reviewing contracts, ultimately giving way
to global contractual renegotiation.
e. Government promoted conflict resolution mechanisms through
specific clauses contained in contracts and in some cases through attempts to
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is noteworthy to see that regulators’ decisions are first appealed to the
Secretariat or the Ministry in charge.  This reveals a low degree of autonomy
and, mainly, that the government was never convinced of granting too much
power to regulatory agencies.
D. Regulatory Incentives
The incentives and detailed regulation varied enormously across sectors.
Therefore, in this section we try to summarize the nature of the main
differences, although we also identify a few common patterns that are shared
by some sectors.
Competition for the Market
The first type of regulation shared by all sectors is the presence of
competition for the market. Typically the rules for this type of competition
involved a first pre-qualification stage where potential entrants had to
demonstrate that they met certain requirements regarding size, financial
capabilities, and relevant experience in the sector. In a second stage, the bid
was decided upon one of the following criteria: highest initial payment to
government (electricity, gas, telecommunication), lowest subsidy (urban
railways), highest annual fee to be paid to government (urban roads, freight
railways), lowest initial tariff (water), and some combination of these elements
plus investment and employment targets (interurban roads).
Regulation in the Market
As for regulation in the market, in all sectors we observe a conceptual
departure from more traditional forms of regulation (i.e. rate of return
regulation) to incentive regulation, although not in its pure form. It is common
to recognize price cap regulation in many sectors, though usually combined
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critical input is involved, as in electricity or gas, or because protection was
granted towards increases in contingent cost elements like taxes, environmental
norms, change in macroeconomic conditions, exchange rate and others). The
results are some forms of hybrid type of regulation where incentives towards
firm efficiency are mixed. In addition, quality targets for services and products
were required in all sectors, as well as detailed investment programs in at
least three sectors (water, roads, and railways). The latter created difficulties
for regulators due to strong information asymmetries. Unsurprisingly,
investment rates were higher in those sectors where specific and detailed
targets were not imposed (electricity, telecommunication, and gas).
Tariff Revision Mechanisms
The mechanism for tariff revision also varied across sectors. In electricity
distribution the first tariff revision is due in the year 2002, and the methodology
for this revision has not been fully specified. In electricity transmission the
first tariff review took place in 1998 and ENRE had to make additional
interpretations to the existing methodology to produce a decision, which left
main transmission users unhappy (mostly generators).
In telecommunications and interurban roads, extraordinary
macroeconomic circumstances (the introduction of the Convertibility plan)
forced a renegotiation to eliminate escalation clauses from the automatic
review process. But in telecommunications the most publicized event related
to tariffs was the issue of how to deal with cross subsidies. The licenses
contained some provisions for rebalancing tariffs to gradually eliminate cross
subsidies. After three years of several public hearings and changes of
regulators, the Supreme Court sustained a government resolution that raised
prices for local calls to compensate for lower international and national long
distances rates.
In water, the norms foresaw that, after the first five years, tariffs could be
adjusted according to the evolution of a simple indicator (income per client).
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collection problems with access charges resulted in a broad contract
renegotiation that altered the basic parameters for the original tariff revision
mechanism.
Contract Duration
The duration of the contractual arrangement has been a delicate issue that
was treated quite differently across sectors. In telecommunications,
exclusivity rights for main basic services (local and long distance calls) were
extended and two new licenses were granted on highly discretionary grounds.
The same discretion was observed in waterways, interurban roads, and
railways where contracts have been renegotiated and the duration of
concessions extended.
Unlike other sectors, the concessions for electricity distribution were
granted for 99 years, but they can be contested every 10 years. This was
designed so as to avoid the problems related to lack of investment at the
end of the concession term. The incumbent, though, has some informational
advantages, not meeting the requirement of a strict bidding parity condition.
In gas, licenses were granted for 35 years, renewable to 10 additional
years. In Buenos Aires urban railways, since the main concern at the time of
privatization was to improve and maintain existing assets, concession contracts
were granted for only 10 years.12 Growing traffic, combined with an increased
demand for better quality conditions have triggered a need for further
investment that were not foreseen at the time of privatization. Urban railway
contracts are therefore being renegotiated on the basis of greater investment,
in exchange for higher tariffs and extended duration. The latter is clearly
limiting the chances to introduce further competition in the future.  Something
similar is happening with interurban road concessions.
12 With the exception of the Urquiza line (sold together with the subway system) for which
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Poor Regulatory Incentive Design Prompted Private Opportunism
The examples above indicate that poor regulatory incentive design
increased the likelihood for ex-post opportunistic behavior from regulated
firms. The combination of poor incentive design with weak regulatory agencies
is doomed to result in some form of renegotiation that may alter conditions in
favor of firms. Let us recall that, when a renegotiation process is initiated,
firms are in a better position than government due to information asymmetries.
The government is typically not well prepared to forecast key elements such
as the evolution of technology, demand conditions and cost efficiency.
E. Analysis of Regulatory Episodes
In Table 2 we present a list of the most relevant regulatory episodes that
illustrate problems derived from wrong regulatory governance structures, poor
regulatory incentives, or both.13 Even if the right incentives were in place,
inappropriate governance structures have lead to regulatory conflicts.  Episodes
related to governance show that despite the will of the executive power to
respect stable “rules of the game” and to avoid introducing political risk,
government opportunism appeared in various sectors. In roads, some firms
were unable to fully collect government subsidies that were set in their
concession contracts. In natural gas, the regulator tried to limit the scope of the
contractual clauses for which distributors could pass-through the price of gas
bought at the wholesale level.14 A similar episode happened with ETOSS, in
13 It should be noted that some of the conflicts are sometimes exacerbated or even triggered
by external shocks such as a technological outbreak that changes the competitive structure
of the market.  For example, the conflict of cross subsidies in telecommunications has been
intensified by the emergence of call back services.
14 It must be said that not all of the gas pass-through conflict can be attributed to contractual
opportunism. There have also been technical difficulties and dynamic factors that caused
contractual stress. For more details, see chapter 12 in FIEL (1999), as well as Abdala and
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the water sector. In electricity, the Secretariat of Energy, by pursuing a proactive
policy in promoting competition, fostered a progressive schedule for retail
access nationwide, changing the initial conditions under which Buenos Aires
distributors obtained their concession rights. In telecommunications, the group
of visible and politically influential urban users pressured to keep local prices
low, and some sectors within government have been tempted to behave
opportunistically, denying or retarding a needed price rebalancing.
Combinations of poor incentives and weak governance have also lead to
problems, as illustrated in Table 2.
III. Alternative Proposals on Regulatory Governance
The role of government institutions such as Congress has been the center
of recent debate, especially in the last two or three years, when changes in
contractual conditions of privatized firms became more widespread. All
initiatives arising from Congress aimed to increase legislative controls, to
balance executive discretionary moves. Although this is a desirable direction,
the way in which Congress should intervene is not trivial. In one extreme
position, there are some deputies that launched the idea of creating a “Super
Ente”, that is, a supra centralized agency for all sectors, that within the orbit
of Congress would have ample authority to interpret and enforce existing
regulatory norms. The main argument supporting this idea is that existing
regulatory agencies are “harmless controlling bodies” of privatized monopolies
because their authority has been constrained by the executive’s decisions,
which tend to maximize its political interests, not necessarily coincident with
those of consumers. It is also argued that existing agencies are too independent
among them, generating a lack of consistency in certain norms that requires
coordination (i.e. natural gas and electricity should coordinate policies
regarding the rational use of energy). The Chilean example of a centralized
agency is cited as a successful story where coordination problems have been
overcome, and where the convergence of lobbying activities due to the over-
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Setting up a centralized regulatory agency within the orbit of Congress
presents, however, many inconveniences. First, would a “Super-Ente” control
by Congress represent the interests of consumers (and society in general)
better than existing agencies? How isolated it would be from short-term
political interests? Will it be less permeable to lobbying than existing agencies?
Second, and perhaps most important, why should Congress take a role that is
clearly of administrative nature? And finally, the potential benefits of
coordination policies within a centralized body should be weighted with the
benefits of having specialized agencies. This short list of “inconveniences” is
not presented here as an argument in favor of the current status quo of
regulatory agencies. Rather, we think that there is a lot of room for
improvements within existing agencies. Regulatory procedures are in many
cases far from being developed, and therefore they lack transparency.
Desirable ex-ante controls from other agencies (like Auditoría General de la
Nación, which depends from Congress, or the Comisión Nacional de Defensa
de la Competencia) are currently not binding or are missing from the
institutional setup.
Other opinions for institutional reform have referred to the need of making
consumers participate in decision-making process of regulatory agencies.
Some politicians have argued that the 1994 Constitution foresees consumers’
participation in regulatory agencies. Comadira (1997) says that the new
Constitution does not necessarily require that consumers have a representation
in the board of directors of regulatory agencies, but that some form of
participation should be granted. How do consumers currently participate in
agencies? The most frequent mean of participation so far has been through
public hearings, which are mandatory only in gas and electricity, and has
been adopted as an optional recourse in telecommunications and most recently
in water and railways transportation. The degree of influence of consumers
through their participation in public hearings over regulator’s decision has
been limited though. In other experiences of consumer involvement like
ETOSS (water and sanitation), consumers formally participate through an
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there is a cooperation agreement for which consumer associations collaborate
in the reception and follow up of telephone users complaints. Having
consumers represented in the board of directors of regulatory agencies is not
a common practice around the world because the agency main task is not to
exclusively protect existing consumers interests but rather to consider an
overall impact on society, taking into account both the needs of present
consumers as well as future ones. Regulators should also balance the demands
from contending interest groups.
Several recommendations have been made to strengthen the institutions
that regulate private utilities. Most proposals are aimed to reshuffle power
from the executive to Congress (through the control of regulatory agencies
and decisions) and/or to increase participation from consumer organizations.
These proposals are destined to fail since they do not recognize that the main
institutional challenges are related to how to restrain government (either
legislative, executive or judicial powers) from opportunism and administrative
expropriation, how to avoid private opportunism associated with poor
regulatory design and weak agencies, and how to provide effective and efficient
mechanism for solving conflicts. Strengthening and improving existing
agencies seems more adequate and realistic than creating new ones.
Establishing transparent procedures that introduce more checks and balances
will work in this direction, providing an umbrella of protection for both firms
and society against government and private opportunism. This proposition
could bring about more transaction costs (in particular in terms of time needed
to approve certain decisions) but the system will gain in transparency and the
costs associated to bad regulatory decisions and poor incentives will be
minimized.
IV. Main Institutional Challenges in Infrastructure Regulation
The permanent institutional challenge of utilities regulation is how to
balance the need for flexibility as required in dynamic environments, with
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opportunistic behavior. Government ought to be respectful of the initial
conditions of the contract not only to avoid opportunism but also to send a
sign that it respects bidding parity conditions. Otherwise, government
reputation will deteriorate so much that we should expect extended lowballing
behavior from private firms in the future. Government has often been giving
signs that substantial renegotiations on contractual conditions can be achieved
ex-post.
In Argentina, contracts have been used extensively in most sectors to give
a framework to the relationship between government and regulated firms.
By analyzing these contracts in all sectors, we can conclude that all of them
contain clauses that granted some flexibility on how to adapt contractual
conditions to future contingencies. Examples of these clauses abound, in
particular related to price adjustments due to changes in tax legislation,
environmental norms, domestic currency stability, etc. But since contracts
are by definition incomplete, there were numerous contingencies that were
unforeseen either in the spirit or in the writing of the contracts. As we have
seen in the examples referred above, in these cases a renegotiation was
inevitable (i.e. the introduction of Convertibility Law, that forced the
elimination of escalation clauses from the telecommunication and interurban
roads sectors).
But we should also question whether incomplete contracts due to failure of
foreseeing how to deal with contingent events were the only cause for
renegotiations. The answers seems to be negative, since in a certain number of
cases the main reason for renegotiation was not incomplete contracts but rather
poor regulatory incentives design.  Poor or wrong incentives have led firms not
to invest according to contractual conditions (i.e. water sector due to
uncollectable bills from access charges, freight railways transportation due to
lower realized demand). It has also led government to push for contractual
changes, as in the case of transportation (roads, railways and waterways)
whenever government subsidies was at stake or some other form of government
participation in the revenue or investment function of the private firm. A major
challenge for future research is how to avoid this type of hold up problems.252 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
We have also observed that government has frequently intervened,
bypassing the regulatory agency authority. In these interventions government
frequently altered the initial contractual conditions because it sought to
accommodate contending interests among groups. Part of these interventions
could possibly be explained by the lack of effective and efficient mechanisms
for solving conflicts (either the specific ones provided for in contracts, the
broader appeals to courts, or both). If regulatory design and enterprise
performance is to be improved, this is a subject for further research in the
regulatory agenda.
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